A Dominican military general accused of ties to drug traffickers showed up
in Miami Friday and denied the allegations.
Washington’s efforts to combat narco-corruption in the region reached the
highest levels of government in the Dominican Republic, where two military
generals close to the president lost their visas to travel to the United
States due to alleged ties to drug traffickers.
President Leonel Fernández’ top military adviser Héctor Medina Medina and
border security chief General Manuel de Jesus Florentino Florentino lost
travel visas under the rule that allows the government to target officials
suspected of corruption, a U.S. government official confirmed.
In at least one case, the high-ranking military leader was returned to the
Dominican Republic after arriving in the United States, the source said.
One of the generals lost his rights to visit as long as a year ago, but the
information surfaced this week amid a heated presidential campaign where the
first lady is a candidate for vice president.
The news, first reported Tuesday by Univision television network, said that
two other top Fernández advisers had also lost their travel visas — but
those men arrived in Miami on Friday and denied the account.
“Impossible,” said Gen. Rafael Guzmán, the former national police chief
who serves as a senior presidential security adviser. “On the contrary, I
invite you go to the Dominican Republic to see that under my tenure was when
we decidedly began to combat drug trafficking for the first time in the
history of the Dominican Republic.”
Guzmán was at Florida International University for a presentation about an
anti-crime program he developed with Prof. Eduardo Gamarra, who works
closely with the president. He said he travels frequently to Miami and has never
been questioned about his visa.
While at least one U.S. embassy cable released by WikiLeaks suggested that
diplomats in Santo Domingo felt confident that Guzmán was cracking down on
corrupt police, cables show the embassy had serious concerns about Medina
and Florentino as far back as 2008.
When Medina was up for a promotion to minister of defense, the cable said
his “potential promotion prompted serious U.S. concern.” Medina was not
elevated, but the embassy was dismayed to see him remain as chief of the
Presidential Military Aide’s Corps, where he would “continue to have a powerful
influence on the President’s military decisions.”
More serious concerns were raised about the retired general in charge of
the border, who was a top intelligence official and former secretary of the
armed forces. The embassy had a “frank discussion” with the president “
concerning questions about Florentino’s competence and personal integrity,”
the cable states.
The embassy suggested he had ties to drug trafficker Quirino Paulino, and said working at the Haitian border would present Florentino
with more “opportunities for graft.” The president, the cable said,
suggested it was too politically volatile to move him, and he would do it some
other time.
The Dominican Republic has become a major transshipment point for Colombian
cocaine, which moves through the country with the help of corrupt top
members of the military. Lower level police are often known to control
trafficking on the streets.
Last year, The Miami Herald reported that the Armed Forces had fired 2,300
soldiers in the three prior years, including two generals and six colonels.
The specialized drug police had dismissed more than 400 of the 2,000
officers.
“This situation with the visas of top people in government is very
worrisome,” said Autonomous University of Santo Domingo Prof. Julio De La Rosa,
who runs an anti-corruption civic organization. “The mere suggestion that
people close to the president are under investigation should be enough for him
to separate himself from them. But instead, he does the opposite.”
Fernández attended public events this week with the implicated advisers.
The president’s spokesman Rafael Nunez did not return calls seeking comment.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/24/2659531/dominican-generals-tied-to-drugs.html#storylink=fbuser
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miércoles, 29 de febrero de 2012
A DOMINICAN MILITARY GENERAL ACCUSED OF TIES TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS SHOWER UP IN MIAMI FRIDAY AND DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS.
A Dominican military general accused of ties to drug traffickers showed up
in Miami Friday and denied the allegations.
Washington’s efforts to combat narco-corruption in the region reached the
highest levels of government in the Dominican Republic, where two military
generals close to the president lost their visas to travel to the United
States due to alleged ties to drug traffickers.
President Leonel Fernández’ top military adviser Héctor Medina Medina and
border security chief General Manuel de Jesus Florentino Florentino lost
travel visas under the rule that allows the government to target officials
suspected of corruption, a U.S. government official confirmed.
In at least one case, the high-ranking military leader was returned to the
Dominican Republic after arriving in the United States, the source said.
One of the generals lost his rights to visit as long as a year ago, but the
information surfaced this week amid a heated presidential campaign where the
first lady is a candidate for vice president.
The news, first reported Tuesday by Univision television network, said that
two other top Fernández advisers had also lost their travel visas — but
those men arrived in Miami on Friday and denied the account.
“Impossible,” said Gen. Rafael Guzmán, the former national police chief
who serves as a senior presidential security adviser. “On the contrary, I
invite you go to the Dominican Republic to see that under my tenure was when
we decidedly began to combat drug trafficking for the first time in the
history of the Dominican Republic.”
Guzmán was at Florida International University for a presentation about an
anti-crime program he developed with Prof. Eduardo Gamarra, who works
closely with the president. He said he travels frequently to Miami and has never
been questioned about his visa.
While at least one U.S. embassy cable released by WikiLeaks suggested that
diplomats in Santo Domingo felt confident that Guzmán was cracking down on
corrupt police, cables show the embassy had serious concerns about Medina
and Florentino as far back as 2008.
When Medina was up for a promotion to minister of defense, the cable said
his “potential promotion prompted serious U.S. concern.” Medina was not
elevated, but the embassy was dismayed to see him remain as chief of the
Presidential Military Aide’s Corps, where he would “continue to have a powerful
influence on the President’s military decisions.”
More serious concerns were raised about the retired general in charge of
the border, who was a top intelligence official and former secretary of the
armed forces. The embassy had a “frank discussion” with the president “
concerning questions about Florentino’s competence and personal integrity,”
the cable states.
The embassy suggested he had ties to drug trafficker Quirino Paulino, and said working at the Haitian border would present Florentino
with more “opportunities for graft.” The president, the cable said,
suggested it was too politically volatile to move him, and he would do it some
other time.
The Dominican Republic has become a major transshipment point for Colombian
cocaine, which moves through the country with the help of corrupt top
members of the military. Lower level police are often known to control
trafficking on the streets.
Last year, The Miami Herald reported that the Armed Forces had fired 2,300
soldiers in the three prior years, including two generals and six colonels.
The specialized drug police had dismissed more than 400 of the 2,000
officers.
“This situation with the visas of top people in government is very
worrisome,” said Autonomous University of Santo Domingo Prof. Julio De La Rosa,
who runs an anti-corruption civic organization. “The mere suggestion that
people close to the president are under investigation should be enough for him
to separate himself from them. But instead, he does the opposite.”
Fernández attended public events this week with the implicated advisers.
The president’s spokesman Rafael Nunez did not return calls seeking comment.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/24/2659531/dominican-generals-tied-to-drugs.html#storylink=fbuser
in Miami Friday and denied the allegations.
Washington’s efforts to combat narco-corruption in the region reached the
highest levels of government in the Dominican Republic, where two military
generals close to the president lost their visas to travel to the United
States due to alleged ties to drug traffickers.
President Leonel Fernández’ top military adviser Héctor Medina Medina and
border security chief General Manuel de Jesus Florentino Florentino lost
travel visas under the rule that allows the government to target officials
suspected of corruption, a U.S. government official confirmed.
In at least one case, the high-ranking military leader was returned to the
Dominican Republic after arriving in the United States, the source said.
One of the generals lost his rights to visit as long as a year ago, but the
information surfaced this week amid a heated presidential campaign where the
first lady is a candidate for vice president.
The news, first reported Tuesday by Univision television network, said that
two other top Fernández advisers had also lost their travel visas — but
those men arrived in Miami on Friday and denied the account.
“Impossible,” said Gen. Rafael Guzmán, the former national police chief
who serves as a senior presidential security adviser. “On the contrary, I
invite you go to the Dominican Republic to see that under my tenure was when
we decidedly began to combat drug trafficking for the first time in the
history of the Dominican Republic.”
Guzmán was at Florida International University for a presentation about an
anti-crime program he developed with Prof. Eduardo Gamarra, who works
closely with the president. He said he travels frequently to Miami and has never
been questioned about his visa.
While at least one U.S. embassy cable released by WikiLeaks suggested that
diplomats in Santo Domingo felt confident that Guzmán was cracking down on
corrupt police, cables show the embassy had serious concerns about Medina
and Florentino as far back as 2008.
When Medina was up for a promotion to minister of defense, the cable said
his “potential promotion prompted serious U.S. concern.” Medina was not
elevated, but the embassy was dismayed to see him remain as chief of the
Presidential Military Aide’s Corps, where he would “continue to have a powerful
influence on the President’s military decisions.”
More serious concerns were raised about the retired general in charge of
the border, who was a top intelligence official and former secretary of the
armed forces. The embassy had a “frank discussion” with the president “
concerning questions about Florentino’s competence and personal integrity,”
the cable states.
The embassy suggested he had ties to drug trafficker Quirino Paulino, and said working at the Haitian border would present Florentino
with more “opportunities for graft.” The president, the cable said,
suggested it was too politically volatile to move him, and he would do it some
other time.
The Dominican Republic has become a major transshipment point for Colombian
cocaine, which moves through the country with the help of corrupt top
members of the military. Lower level police are often known to control
trafficking on the streets.
Last year, The Miami Herald reported that the Armed Forces had fired 2,300
soldiers in the three prior years, including two generals and six colonels.
The specialized drug police had dismissed more than 400 of the 2,000
officers.
“This situation with the visas of top people in government is very
worrisome,” said Autonomous University of Santo Domingo Prof. Julio De La Rosa,
who runs an anti-corruption civic organization. “The mere suggestion that
people close to the president are under investigation should be enough for him
to separate himself from them. But instead, he does the opposite.”
Fernández attended public events this week with the implicated advisers.
The president’s spokesman Rafael Nunez did not return calls seeking comment.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/24/2659531/dominican-generals-tied-to-drugs.html#storylink=fbuser
A DOMINICAN MILITARY GENERAL ACCUSED OF TIES TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS SHOWER UP IN MIAMI FRIDAY AND DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS.
A Dominican military general accused of ties to drug traffickers showed up
in Miami Friday and denied the allegations.
Washington’s efforts to combat narco-corruption in the region reached the
highest levels of government in the Dominican Republic, where two military
generals close to the president lost their visas to travel to the United
States due to alleged ties to drug traffickers.
President Leonel Fernández’ top military adviser Héctor Medina Medina and
border security chief General Manuel de Jesus Florentino Florentino lost
travel visas under the rule that allows the government to target officials
suspected of corruption, a U.S. government official confirmed.
In at least one case, the high-ranking military leader was returned to the
Dominican Republic after arriving in the United States, the source said.
One of the generals lost his rights to visit as long as a year ago, but the
information surfaced this week amid a heated presidential campaign where the
first lady is a candidate for vice president.
The news, first reported Tuesday by Univision television network, said that
two other top Fernández advisers had also lost their travel visas — but
those men arrived in Miami on Friday and denied the account.
“Impossible,” said Gen. Rafael Guzmán, the former national police chief
who serves as a senior presidential security adviser. “On the contrary, I
invite you go to the Dominican Republic to see that under my tenure was when
we decidedly began to combat drug trafficking for the first time in the
history of the Dominican Republic.”
Guzmán was at Florida International University for a presentation about an
anti-crime program he developed with Prof. Eduardo Gamarra, who works
closely with the president. He said he travels frequently to Miami and has never
been questioned about his visa.
While at least one U.S. embassy cable released by WikiLeaks suggested that
diplomats in Santo Domingo felt confident that Guzmán was cracking down on
corrupt police, cables show the embassy had serious concerns about Medina
and Florentino as far back as 2008.
When Medina was up for a promotion to minister of defense, the cable said
his “potential promotion prompted serious U.S. concern.” Medina was not
elevated, but the embassy was dismayed to see him remain as chief of the
Presidential Military Aide’s Corps, where he would “continue to have a powerful
influence on the President’s military decisions.”
More serious concerns were raised about the retired general in charge of
the border, who was a top intelligence official and former secretary of the
armed forces. The embassy had a “frank discussion” with the president “
concerning questions about Florentino’s competence and personal integrity,”
the cable states.
The embassy suggested he had ties to drug trafficker Quirino Paulino, and said working at the Haitian border would present Florentino
with more “opportunities for graft.” The president, the cable said,
suggested it was too politically volatile to move him, and he would do it some
other time.
The Dominican Republic has become a major transshipment point for Colombian
cocaine, which moves through the country with the help of corrupt top
members of the military. Lower level police are often known to control
trafficking on the streets.
Last year, The Miami Herald reported that the Armed Forces had fired 2,300
soldiers in the three prior years, including two generals and six colonels.
The specialized drug police had dismissed more than 400 of the 2,000
officers.
“This situation with the visas of top people in government is very
worrisome,” said Autonomous University of Santo Domingo Prof. Julio De La Rosa,
who runs an anti-corruption civic organization. “The mere suggestion that
people close to the president are under investigation should be enough for him
to separate himself from them. But instead, he does the opposite.”
Fernández attended public events this week with the implicated advisers.
The president’s spokesman Rafael Nunez did not return calls seeking comment.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/24/2659531/dominican-generals-tied-to-drugs.html#storylink=fbuser
in Miami Friday and denied the allegations.
Washington’s efforts to combat narco-corruption in the region reached the
highest levels of government in the Dominican Republic, where two military
generals close to the president lost their visas to travel to the United
States due to alleged ties to drug traffickers.
President Leonel Fernández’ top military adviser Héctor Medina Medina and
border security chief General Manuel de Jesus Florentino Florentino lost
travel visas under the rule that allows the government to target officials
suspected of corruption, a U.S. government official confirmed.
In at least one case, the high-ranking military leader was returned to the
Dominican Republic after arriving in the United States, the source said.
One of the generals lost his rights to visit as long as a year ago, but the
information surfaced this week amid a heated presidential campaign where the
first lady is a candidate for vice president.
The news, first reported Tuesday by Univision television network, said that
two other top Fernández advisers had also lost their travel visas — but
those men arrived in Miami on Friday and denied the account.
“Impossible,” said Gen. Rafael Guzmán, the former national police chief
who serves as a senior presidential security adviser. “On the contrary, I
invite you go to the Dominican Republic to see that under my tenure was when
we decidedly began to combat drug trafficking for the first time in the
history of the Dominican Republic.”
Guzmán was at Florida International University for a presentation about an
anti-crime program he developed with Prof. Eduardo Gamarra, who works
closely with the president. He said he travels frequently to Miami and has never
been questioned about his visa.
While at least one U.S. embassy cable released by WikiLeaks suggested that
diplomats in Santo Domingo felt confident that Guzmán was cracking down on
corrupt police, cables show the embassy had serious concerns about Medina
and Florentino as far back as 2008.
When Medina was up for a promotion to minister of defense, the cable said
his “potential promotion prompted serious U.S. concern.” Medina was not
elevated, but the embassy was dismayed to see him remain as chief of the
Presidential Military Aide’s Corps, where he would “continue to have a powerful
influence on the President’s military decisions.”
More serious concerns were raised about the retired general in charge of
the border, who was a top intelligence official and former secretary of the
armed forces. The embassy had a “frank discussion” with the president “
concerning questions about Florentino’s competence and personal integrity,”
the cable states.
The embassy suggested he had ties to drug trafficker Quirino Paulino, and said working at the Haitian border would present Florentino
with more “opportunities for graft.” The president, the cable said,
suggested it was too politically volatile to move him, and he would do it some
other time.
The Dominican Republic has become a major transshipment point for Colombian
cocaine, which moves through the country with the help of corrupt top
members of the military. Lower level police are often known to control
trafficking on the streets.
Last year, The Miami Herald reported that the Armed Forces had fired 2,300
soldiers in the three prior years, including two generals and six colonels.
The specialized drug police had dismissed more than 400 of the 2,000
officers.
“This situation with the visas of top people in government is very
worrisome,” said Autonomous University of Santo Domingo Prof. Julio De La Rosa,
who runs an anti-corruption civic organization. “The mere suggestion that
people close to the president are under investigation should be enough for him
to separate himself from them. But instead, he does the opposite.”
Fernández attended public events this week with the implicated advisers.
The president’s spokesman Rafael Nunez did not return calls seeking comment.
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/02/24/2659531/dominican-generals-tied-to-drugs.html#storylink=fbuser
EL SERVICIO DE LA DEUDA PUBLICA DOMINICANA, 8 ANOS DE HERENCIA QUE LE DEJA EL GOBIERNO A LAS FUTURAS GENERACIONES; VEAMOS LA AMORTIZACION A MUCHOS ANO
Miguel Ceara-Hatton
El Ministerio de Hacienda acaba de publicar las proyecciones del pago de intereses y la amortización de la deuda externa del sector público no financiero hasta el año 2045 y de la deuda interna del Gobierno Central hasta el 2030. Estos datos nos sirven para hacer unas proyecciones de lo que le costará a los dominicanos y dominicanas la carrera de endeudamiento de los últimos años. Este análisis no toma en cuenta la deuda del Banco Central que es también deuda pública pero que no se publica es las estadísticas del Ministerio de Hacienda.
En los últimos años hemos escuchado hasta el hartazgo que el país puede seguir endeudándose, porque la relación deuda en porciento del PIB es baja y hay espacio para más deuda pública. Soy de los que opina que se está creando una situación explosiva en la medida en que el país se vea obligado a dedicar una proporción cada vez mayor de los ingresos tributarios al pago de los intereses y a la amortización de la deuda. Particularmente en el caso del pago de los intereses que es difícil de renegociar, por no decir imposible y no es razonable endeudarse para pagarlo. No así con la amortización de la deuda que presenta más rejuego.
¿Porqué hablo de una crisis social? Porque hay dos opciones básicamente: austeridad en los gastos que tienen que ver con el desarrollo de la población o más impuestos.
A lo anterior se le agrega la idoneidad y pulcritud de esa deuda. Sabemos que esa deuda se toma en un país en donde todas las comparaciones internacionales muestran que República Dominicana registra un elevado nivel de corrupción y que además está en deterioro. Las impunidades y las complicidades son la norma. En efecto, simplemente hay que mirar los valores y posiciones que ocupa República Dominicana en el índice de Transparencia Internacional, en los índices de control de la corrupción del Banco Mundial y en índice de competitividad global del Foro Económico Mundial entre otros. Casi con certeza se puede decir que muchos de esos recursos se han utilizado para fines espurios, para financiar riquezas personales, campañas políticas entre otros fines.
Veamos las cifras
1. La deuda pública, sin incluir a la del Banco Central, crece aceleradamente. En particular desde 2008 en adelante, en efecto el 68% de los US$13.3 mil millones de deuda nueva acumulada entre 2000 y 2011, se creó entre 2008 y 2011. La deuda entre 2007 y 2011 se ha multiplicado por 2.20 veces, la cual financia la estabilidad macroeconómica, los subsidios y el crecimiento de esos años (Gráfico 1).
2. El costo de esa política es un comportamiento explosivo del servicio de la deuda (amortización e intereses), en particular entre 2013 y 2016. En efecto, el servicio total en términos percápita y en dólares muestra que la deuda alcanzará un pico en 2014 y será durante el cuatrienio 2013-2016 un 35% superior al cuatrienio inmediatamente anterior (Gráfico 2).
3. ¿Cuándo cuesta el endeudamiento de estos 8 años en términos del PIB nominal?
En el próximo cuatrienio se pagará, en algunos años más del 5% del PIB en servicio total de la deuda, llegando a un pico de 5.6% del PIB en 2014. Sin embargo, una característica importante es que la composición del servicio total de la deuda se modifica. En 2012-2016, el componente de los intereses será superior al componente de la amortización. Como se ha señalado anteriormente, el monto a amortizar de la deuda se puede renegociar o financiarse con nueva deuda, pero los intereses no pueden refinanciarse. El pago de intereses alcanzará 2.8% del PIB en 2015, un valor cercano a lo que se pretende gastar en educación en 2012 (Gráfico 3).
4. ¿Cuánto de los ingresos tributarios se destinarán al pago de intereses y a amortización de la deuda?
Suponiendo que la presión tributaria se mantenga en el mismo nivel que hay en 2012, de 13.9%, el costo de la deuda pública externa alcanzará en promedio durante el período 2013-2016, casi el 20% de los ingresos tributarios y eso es una cifra ligeramente más baja de lo que recibiría el Ministerio de Educación (alrededor del 3% del PIB y la función educación el 4%).
Si el próximo Gobierno decide pagar lo mismo, en promedio, que en el cuatrienio pasado de los ingresos tributarios, es decir, pagar 16.1% en vez de 19.5% como está previsto, entonces tendría que aumentar la presión tributaria en casi 3 puntos porcentuales, lo cual es prácticamente imposible dado el nivel de deslegitimidad del Gobierno Dominicano asociado al problema de la corrupción y al desvío de fondos.
En resumen, la evidencia empírica disponible, en base a las proyecciones del Ministerio de Hacienda indican que el gobierno saliente dejará una “bomba de tiempo” debido a la magnitud del servicio de la deuda, la cual dada las condiciones actuales y previsibles de la economía dominicana es difícil enfrentarla. Una deuda regularmente contraída para fines dudosos, de poco impacto en el desarrollo humano de los dominicanos y dominicanas, los cuales tendrán que pagarla con un deterioro en su nivel de vida, creando las condiciones para fuerte tensiones sociales. Para evitar ese deterioro y reducir las tensiones, el Estado tendrá que legitimarse, lo cual reclama un combate frontal con la corrupción, acabar con las impunidades y las complicidades para abrirle espacio a los ajustes fiscales. De esa terrible herencia no se habló en el discurso del 27 de Febrero, aunque si se nos habló de que ya somos un “Nueva York Chiquito” donde ni siquiera se han cumplido los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio.
Nota metodológica: ¿Cómo se hicieron estos cálculos?
El cuadro 1 y 2 muestra las proyecciones realizadas por el Ministerio de Hacienda. Estos compromisos aparecen en pesos y en dólares, por lo tanto para analizar el impacto en la economía dominicana habrá que convertirlo todo a una sola moneda, digamos el peso dominicano.
Para hacer esa conversión hay que proyectar el tipo de cambio, para lo cual utilizaremos el criterio del tipo de cambio de paridad, es decir, el que mantiene la paridad de hoy de RD$39 pesos por dólar dado la inflación promedio de EEUU y de Dominicana. Asumiremos conservadoramente que la inflación promedio de EEUU será 2.5% anual entre 2012 y 2025 y la Dominicana de 5.5%, ambas son conservadoras e implicaría un ritmo de devaluación promedio anual de 2.9% necesario para mantener la paridad del tipo de cambio. La paridad implica que no se deteriora la competitividad de los exportadores por las diferencias de tasas de inflación en ambos países. El cuadro 3 muestra la trayectoria del tipo de cambio.
Para el cálculo del PIB nominal se asumió un crecimiento del PIB nominal de 10.5% y en cuadro 4 se presenta la serie desde 1991 a 2025 del servicio total de la deuda valorada en peso.
Cuadro 2. Proyección del servicio deuda interna del Gobierno Central (millones de pesos)
Años Total Servicio Gobierno Central Amortización Intereses + comisiones
2012) 67,092.6 30,104.8 36,987.8
2013 57,612.3 12,813.6 44,798.7
2014 65,253.9 10,243.2 55,010.7
2015 80,912.2 15,110.9 65,801.2
2016 91,677.4 17,703.8 73,973.6
2017 28,885.1 6,532.0 22,353.1
2018 32,153.4 11,287.8 20,865.6
2019 31,988.7 12,437.8 19,550.8
2020 37,591.3 19,880.5 17,710.9
2021 26,830.1 13,000.0 13,830.1
2022 20,468.6 7,988.1 12,480.5
2023 19,637.7 8,454.3 11,183.4
2024 24,101.5 14,510.8 9,590.7
2025 16,370.8 8,880.5 7,490.3
2026-30 61,430.7 40,102.8 21,327.9
Fuente: Ministerio de Hacienda
Cuadro 1. Proyección del servicio deuda externa del sector público no financiero (millones de dólares)
Años Total Amortización Intereses + Comisiones
2012 1,123.6 639.0 484.6
2013 1,908.5 1,402.7 505.7
2014 2,320.6 1,783.1 537.5
2015 1,539.3 976.4 562.9
2016 1,506.5 941.5 565.0
2017 1,475.7 942.7 532.9
2018 1,322.6 829.7 492.8
2019 1,649.9 1,205.3 444.6
2020 1,522.8 1,138.6 384.1
2021 1,416.2 1,091.0 325.2
2022 855.4 567.8 287.6
2023 956.5 687.4 269.1
2024 864.1 624.2 239.9
2025 838.3 628.9 209.4
2026 641.3 463.4 177.9
2027 634.2 475.0 159.2
2028 570.5 431.2 139.2
2029 527.8 392.3 135.5
2030 507.3 386.1 121.1
2031-45 3,468.8 2,305.3 1,163.5
Fuente: Ministerio de Hacienda
Proyección del servicio de la deuda pública total en RD$ miles de pesos
Años Total en miles de millones RD$ Amortización en miles de millones RD$ Intereses en miles de millones RD$
1991 1.3 0.7 0.7
1992 2.8 2.2 0.6
1993 3.5 1.9 1.6
1994 3.1 1.9 1.2
1995 3.9 2.4 1.5
1996 3.1 2.1 1.0
1997 4.9 3.8 1.1
1998 4.8 3.6 1.3
1999 5.2 3.8 1.4
2000 7.6 6.1 1.5
2001 11.4 8.9 2.5
2002 13.6 10.3 3.3
2003 25.0 16.6 8.4
2004 37.3 23.6 13.7
2005 32.6 21.8 10.8
2006 50.9 35.1 15.8
2007 56.7 35.0 21.6
2008 57.2 31.0 26.2
2009 67.7 37.1 30.5
2010 89.5 52.2 37.2
2011 113.6 63.7 49.9
2012 110.9 55.8 56.7
2013 134.2 69.1 65.1
2014 161.1 83.9 77.2
2015 146.4 56.6 89.7
2016 157.6 58.9 98.7
2017 95.4 49.0 46.4
2018 93.5 49.8 43.7
2019 110.7 70.0 40.8
2020 112.4 75.8 36.6
2021 98.4 68.2 30.3
2022 65.0 37.5 27.4
2023 70.9 45.3 25.6
2024 71.7 48.9 22.8
2025 63.9 44.6 19.4
Fuente: Elaborado con información del Ministerio de Hacienda
Cuadro 3. Tipo de cambio de paridad
Tasa de inflación promedio Tipo de cambio de paridad
RD 5.5% EEUU 2.5
1.000 1.000 39
1.055 1.025 40.14
1.113 1.051 41.32
1.174 1.077 42.53
1.239 1.104 43.77
1.307 1.131 45.05
1.379 1.160 46.37
1.455 1.189 47.73
1.535 1.218 49.12
1.619 1.249 50.56
1.708 1.280 52.04
1.802 1.312 53.56
1.901 1.345 55.13
2.006 1.379 56.75
El Ministerio de Hacienda acaba de publicar las proyecciones del pago de intereses y la amortización de la deuda externa del sector público no financiero hasta el año 2045 y de la deuda interna del Gobierno Central hasta el 2030. Estos datos nos sirven para hacer unas proyecciones de lo que le costará a los dominicanos y dominicanas la carrera de endeudamiento de los últimos años. Este análisis no toma en cuenta la deuda del Banco Central que es también deuda pública pero que no se publica es las estadísticas del Ministerio de Hacienda.
En los últimos años hemos escuchado hasta el hartazgo que el país puede seguir endeudándose, porque la relación deuda en porciento del PIB es baja y hay espacio para más deuda pública. Soy de los que opina que se está creando una situación explosiva en la medida en que el país se vea obligado a dedicar una proporción cada vez mayor de los ingresos tributarios al pago de los intereses y a la amortización de la deuda. Particularmente en el caso del pago de los intereses que es difícil de renegociar, por no decir imposible y no es razonable endeudarse para pagarlo. No así con la amortización de la deuda que presenta más rejuego.
¿Porqué hablo de una crisis social? Porque hay dos opciones básicamente: austeridad en los gastos que tienen que ver con el desarrollo de la población o más impuestos.
A lo anterior se le agrega la idoneidad y pulcritud de esa deuda. Sabemos que esa deuda se toma en un país en donde todas las comparaciones internacionales muestran que República Dominicana registra un elevado nivel de corrupción y que además está en deterioro. Las impunidades y las complicidades son la norma. En efecto, simplemente hay que mirar los valores y posiciones que ocupa República Dominicana en el índice de Transparencia Internacional, en los índices de control de la corrupción del Banco Mundial y en índice de competitividad global del Foro Económico Mundial entre otros. Casi con certeza se puede decir que muchos de esos recursos se han utilizado para fines espurios, para financiar riquezas personales, campañas políticas entre otros fines.
Veamos las cifras
1. La deuda pública, sin incluir a la del Banco Central, crece aceleradamente. En particular desde 2008 en adelante, en efecto el 68% de los US$13.3 mil millones de deuda nueva acumulada entre 2000 y 2011, se creó entre 2008 y 2011. La deuda entre 2007 y 2011 se ha multiplicado por 2.20 veces, la cual financia la estabilidad macroeconómica, los subsidios y el crecimiento de esos años (Gráfico 1).
2. El costo de esa política es un comportamiento explosivo del servicio de la deuda (amortización e intereses), en particular entre 2013 y 2016. En efecto, el servicio total en términos percápita y en dólares muestra que la deuda alcanzará un pico en 2014 y será durante el cuatrienio 2013-2016 un 35% superior al cuatrienio inmediatamente anterior (Gráfico 2).
3. ¿Cuándo cuesta el endeudamiento de estos 8 años en términos del PIB nominal?
En el próximo cuatrienio se pagará, en algunos años más del 5% del PIB en servicio total de la deuda, llegando a un pico de 5.6% del PIB en 2014. Sin embargo, una característica importante es que la composición del servicio total de la deuda se modifica. En 2012-2016, el componente de los intereses será superior al componente de la amortización. Como se ha señalado anteriormente, el monto a amortizar de la deuda se puede renegociar o financiarse con nueva deuda, pero los intereses no pueden refinanciarse. El pago de intereses alcanzará 2.8% del PIB en 2015, un valor cercano a lo que se pretende gastar en educación en 2012 (Gráfico 3).
4. ¿Cuánto de los ingresos tributarios se destinarán al pago de intereses y a amortización de la deuda?
Suponiendo que la presión tributaria se mantenga en el mismo nivel que hay en 2012, de 13.9%, el costo de la deuda pública externa alcanzará en promedio durante el período 2013-2016, casi el 20% de los ingresos tributarios y eso es una cifra ligeramente más baja de lo que recibiría el Ministerio de Educación (alrededor del 3% del PIB y la función educación el 4%).
Si el próximo Gobierno decide pagar lo mismo, en promedio, que en el cuatrienio pasado de los ingresos tributarios, es decir, pagar 16.1% en vez de 19.5% como está previsto, entonces tendría que aumentar la presión tributaria en casi 3 puntos porcentuales, lo cual es prácticamente imposible dado el nivel de deslegitimidad del Gobierno Dominicano asociado al problema de la corrupción y al desvío de fondos.
En resumen, la evidencia empírica disponible, en base a las proyecciones del Ministerio de Hacienda indican que el gobierno saliente dejará una “bomba de tiempo” debido a la magnitud del servicio de la deuda, la cual dada las condiciones actuales y previsibles de la economía dominicana es difícil enfrentarla. Una deuda regularmente contraída para fines dudosos, de poco impacto en el desarrollo humano de los dominicanos y dominicanas, los cuales tendrán que pagarla con un deterioro en su nivel de vida, creando las condiciones para fuerte tensiones sociales. Para evitar ese deterioro y reducir las tensiones, el Estado tendrá que legitimarse, lo cual reclama un combate frontal con la corrupción, acabar con las impunidades y las complicidades para abrirle espacio a los ajustes fiscales. De esa terrible herencia no se habló en el discurso del 27 de Febrero, aunque si se nos habló de que ya somos un “Nueva York Chiquito” donde ni siquiera se han cumplido los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio.
Nota metodológica: ¿Cómo se hicieron estos cálculos?
El cuadro 1 y 2 muestra las proyecciones realizadas por el Ministerio de Hacienda. Estos compromisos aparecen en pesos y en dólares, por lo tanto para analizar el impacto en la economía dominicana habrá que convertirlo todo a una sola moneda, digamos el peso dominicano.
Para hacer esa conversión hay que proyectar el tipo de cambio, para lo cual utilizaremos el criterio del tipo de cambio de paridad, es decir, el que mantiene la paridad de hoy de RD$39 pesos por dólar dado la inflación promedio de EEUU y de Dominicana. Asumiremos conservadoramente que la inflación promedio de EEUU será 2.5% anual entre 2012 y 2025 y la Dominicana de 5.5%, ambas son conservadoras e implicaría un ritmo de devaluación promedio anual de 2.9% necesario para mantener la paridad del tipo de cambio. La paridad implica que no se deteriora la competitividad de los exportadores por las diferencias de tasas de inflación en ambos países. El cuadro 3 muestra la trayectoria del tipo de cambio.
Para el cálculo del PIB nominal se asumió un crecimiento del PIB nominal de 10.5% y en cuadro 4 se presenta la serie desde 1991 a 2025 del servicio total de la deuda valorada en peso.
Cuadro 2. Proyección del servicio deuda interna del Gobierno Central (millones de pesos)
Años Total Servicio Gobierno Central Amortización Intereses + comisiones
2012) 67,092.6 30,104.8 36,987.8
2013 57,612.3 12,813.6 44,798.7
2014 65,253.9 10,243.2 55,010.7
2015 80,912.2 15,110.9 65,801.2
2016 91,677.4 17,703.8 73,973.6
2017 28,885.1 6,532.0 22,353.1
2018 32,153.4 11,287.8 20,865.6
2019 31,988.7 12,437.8 19,550.8
2020 37,591.3 19,880.5 17,710.9
2021 26,830.1 13,000.0 13,830.1
2022 20,468.6 7,988.1 12,480.5
2023 19,637.7 8,454.3 11,183.4
2024 24,101.5 14,510.8 9,590.7
2025 16,370.8 8,880.5 7,490.3
2026-30 61,430.7 40,102.8 21,327.9
Fuente: Ministerio de Hacienda
Cuadro 1. Proyección del servicio deuda externa del sector público no financiero (millones de dólares)
Años Total Amortización Intereses + Comisiones
2012 1,123.6 639.0 484.6
2013 1,908.5 1,402.7 505.7
2014 2,320.6 1,783.1 537.5
2015 1,539.3 976.4 562.9
2016 1,506.5 941.5 565.0
2017 1,475.7 942.7 532.9
2018 1,322.6 829.7 492.8
2019 1,649.9 1,205.3 444.6
2020 1,522.8 1,138.6 384.1
2021 1,416.2 1,091.0 325.2
2022 855.4 567.8 287.6
2023 956.5 687.4 269.1
2024 864.1 624.2 239.9
2025 838.3 628.9 209.4
2026 641.3 463.4 177.9
2027 634.2 475.0 159.2
2028 570.5 431.2 139.2
2029 527.8 392.3 135.5
2030 507.3 386.1 121.1
2031-45 3,468.8 2,305.3 1,163.5
Fuente: Ministerio de Hacienda
Proyección del servicio de la deuda pública total en RD$ miles de pesos
Años Total en miles de millones RD$ Amortización en miles de millones RD$ Intereses en miles de millones RD$
1991 1.3 0.7 0.7
1992 2.8 2.2 0.6
1993 3.5 1.9 1.6
1994 3.1 1.9 1.2
1995 3.9 2.4 1.5
1996 3.1 2.1 1.0
1997 4.9 3.8 1.1
1998 4.8 3.6 1.3
1999 5.2 3.8 1.4
2000 7.6 6.1 1.5
2001 11.4 8.9 2.5
2002 13.6 10.3 3.3
2003 25.0 16.6 8.4
2004 37.3 23.6 13.7
2005 32.6 21.8 10.8
2006 50.9 35.1 15.8
2007 56.7 35.0 21.6
2008 57.2 31.0 26.2
2009 67.7 37.1 30.5
2010 89.5 52.2 37.2
2011 113.6 63.7 49.9
2012 110.9 55.8 56.7
2013 134.2 69.1 65.1
2014 161.1 83.9 77.2
2015 146.4 56.6 89.7
2016 157.6 58.9 98.7
2017 95.4 49.0 46.4
2018 93.5 49.8 43.7
2019 110.7 70.0 40.8
2020 112.4 75.8 36.6
2021 98.4 68.2 30.3
2022 65.0 37.5 27.4
2023 70.9 45.3 25.6
2024 71.7 48.9 22.8
2025 63.9 44.6 19.4
Fuente: Elaborado con información del Ministerio de Hacienda
Cuadro 3. Tipo de cambio de paridad
Tasa de inflación promedio Tipo de cambio de paridad
RD 5.5% EEUU 2.5
1.000 1.000 39
1.055 1.025 40.14
1.113 1.051 41.32
1.174 1.077 42.53
1.239 1.104 43.77
1.307 1.131 45.05
1.379 1.160 46.37
1.455 1.189 47.73
1.535 1.218 49.12
1.619 1.249 50.56
1.708 1.280 52.04
1.802 1.312 53.56
1.901 1.345 55.13
2.006 1.379 56.75